This paper investigates the drivers of systemic risk and contagion among European banks.
Introduction
Which factors determine the interconnectedness of European banks? In this paper, we investigate the drivers of contagion and systemic risk among European banks using a large bank dataset with CDS quotes from 2005 to 2014. Banking contagiona widely debatable issuerefers to the transmission of a bank shock to other banks or the financial system. It lies at the heart of systemic risk. Contagion is defined as a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock measured by the degree to which asset prices move together (Dornbusch et al., 2000) . Early, Bagehot (1873) diagnoses that "in wild periods of alarm, one failure makes many, and the best way to prevent the derivative failures is to arrest the primary failure which causes them". To this end, we propose two novel measures of systemic risk through contagion using copula functions and credit default swap (CDS) data to capture the systemic impact a single bank default has on the banking system (later systemic risk contribution) and vice versa (later systemic risk sensitivity). The topic of our paper is of considerable interest to regulators and economists as well: Our results offer new insights into the drivers of financial instability and provide implications for the macroprudential regulation of banks.
Financial systems as a whole tend toward instability. This is due to the fragile nature of their players, especially banks. Because of their ro le as a financial intermediary (or delegated monitor), their opaqueness, their interconnectedness, and the typical characteristics of their lenders, banks are particularly prone to affecting other banks with financial distressor to being affected by them. Consequently, the identification of drivers of distress of systemically important banks (SIBs) is of vital importance. Recent papers on contagion among banks produced substantial findings. Dornbusch et al. (2000) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) , among others, argue that financial contagion can be ambiguous: As long as the magnitude of negative shocks affecting financial institutions is sufficiently small, a more densely connected financial network (corresponding to a more diversified pattern of interbank liabilities) enhances financial stability. In this paper, however, we do not look at the network structure of interbank markets itself but focus on systemic default contagion. Existing literature in this field is comparably young and leaves questions unanswered: (1) First, it is unclear which channels of contagion systemic banking crises have. (2) Second, there is no consensus on how to identify systemically important banks. (3) Third, it is unknown how to measure the potential negative impact those banks can have on the financial system. We contribute to fill in these research gaps by proposing innovative key indicators to measure the extent to which single banks impact on the banking system and vice versa, as well as controlling for determinants of those contagious procedures. This is carried out as follows:
Section 2 offers a review of related literature on contagion and systemic risk (in Europe) as our background and starting point. The subsequent section presents our copula-based model to estimate systemic risk using CDS quotes. The bank selection and data collection are explained in Section 4. In the fifth section, we derive key determinants of contagion in the banking sector, while Section 6 concludes our findings.
Related Literature
In this section, we briefly discuss the related theoretical and empirical literature on using copulas for estimating contagion and identifying drivers of systemic risk in the European banking sector. Dornbusch et al. (2000) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) , among others, argue that the ways in which bank shocks are transmitted do seem to differ, and these differences are important. We follow their line of thought and propose two novel measures of systemic risk.
The first step for the identification of drivers of systemic risk is the assessment of systemic risk levels. The number of measures for systemic risk is growing fast 1 . The existing literature can be divided into the (1) systemic risk sensitivity-and the (2) systemic risk contribution stream. Approaches for (1) systemic risk sensitivity (Acharya et al., 2011; Brownlees and Engle, 2012; Jobst and Gray, 2013; Weiß et al., 2014) try to determine systemic importance by measuring the extent to what a single institution is affected in case of a systemic macroeconomic event (e.g. interest rate change); see Figure 1 . The overall functioning of the (financial) system and individual institutional resilience is in the focus of this first approach 2 .
Conversely designed measures dealing with the (2) systemic risk contribution (Chan-Lau, 2010; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Billio et al., 2012; León and Murcia, 2013) try to determine systemic importance by measuring the impact of a negative shock in a single institution on systemic risk 3 . These measures assess how one institution affects a group of others; see Figure 1 . According to this understanding, it is of special interest to avoid and mitigate contagion effects. Copulas (see definition in Section 3.1 ahead) have been applied in different ways in the context of systemic risk. Engle et al. (2014) , for instance, use a particular copula (Student t) to represent the dependence across innovations of errors in a GARCH model related to firms' and regions' stock returns. CDS are increasingly used as a proxy for credit risk. Oh and Patton (2013) propose the use of multivariate copulas to model the relationship among CDS spreads and to estimate the CDS issuers' joint probability of distress which is presented as proxy for systemic risk. Martínez-Jaramillo et al. (2010) join individual banks' loss distributions by means of copulas and generate a univariate loss distribution for the whole financial system.
Based on this distribution, the authors use risk measures, such as the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR or Expected Shortfall), to evaluate the system's risk. Philippas and Siriopoulos (2013) study the contagion among six European bond markets by applying bivariate (Student t) copulas with time-varying parameters to model the association across bond returns. Buhler and Prokopczuk (2010) use a particular copula ("BB7") to model the dependence across stock returns in several industry sectors and in the banking sector.
We use CDS prices rather than stock returns as a measure of contagion for one major reason:
Unlike CDS, stock prices capture more than the default probability but current and future levels of economic activity (Grossman and Shiller, 1981) . Market participants' perception of the value of the assets of a certain issuer may be insightful, but we believe that the pure assessment of default risks and how they ultimately spread gives a clearer idea of contagion and systemic risk among financial institutions.
To sum up, the literature related to the application of copulas in systemic risk investigates the relationship among financial variables (e.g. stock returns and CDS spreads). At this point our study innovates by considering the financial institutions' probabilities of default as the variable of interest and by exploring a novel link between this variable and copula functions.
Whereas previous works assume the copula to be used (e.g. Engle et al., 2014; Philippas and Siriopoulos, 2013; Buhler and Prokopczuk, 2010) , we estimate the best-fit copula for our data using goodness-of-fit tests 4 . This represents an advantage of our study since we select, among some theoretically justified candidates, the empirically most suitable copula for each specific data analysed whilst copulas previously assumed, as done in other studies, might not represent the data considered.
The second step for the identification of drivers of systemic risk and contagion is to run panel regression analyses on our systemic risk results with different potential factors from the micro or macro level that may affect systemic risk. Previous papers came to following findings: Starting with the (1) risk sensitivity approach Engle et al. (2014) find that banks account for approximately 80% of the systemic risk in Europe, with UK and French institutions bearing the highest levels of systemic risk. Acharya and Steffen (2014) come to the conclusion that banks' sovereign debt holdings are major contributors to systemic risk. Vallascas and Keasey (2012) spot several key drivers of systemic risk of European banks like high leverage, low liquidity, size and high non-interest income. Varotto and Zhao (2014) confirm the positive impact of size and leverage on systemic risk for a set of European banks. Black et al. (2013) confirm that bank size has a positive impact on the increase of systemic risk. Interestingly they also find that European banks with a more traditional lending business and more liquid assets are less likely to increase systemic risk. Lastly, they find that bank profitability has no impact on systemic risk and the market to book ratio has an unstable influence on banks' systemic risk in Europe. 
Measuring systemic risk and contagion
To measure systemic risk and contagion in the European banking system, we propose new risk measures, systemic risk sensitivity and systemic risk contribution controlling for the two channels of contagion illustrated in Figure 1 by combining the interpretation of default in structural credit risk models and copula functions. The first measure captures the potential impact of a banking system's distress on each financial institution and the second measure captures the potential impact of an institution's failure on the banking system. To analyse the determinants of systemic risk, we make use of the approaches elaborated by Acharya and Steffen (2014) , and Weiß et al. (2014) .
Copulas
Copulas are functions that link univariate distributions to the multivariate distribution of the related variables:
where C is the copula, H(.) is a bivariate function, and F X (.) and F Y (.) are cumulative distribution functions of X and Y, respectively.
Due to the "Probability Integral Transformation", F X (x) and F Y (y) represent variables uniformly distributed in (0,1). That is, whenever a random variable is evaluated in its own continuous cumulative distribution function (F), all the resultant values are equally spread in the interval between 0 and 1 (Casella and Berger, 2008) .
So, the copula C links uniform variables, F X (x) and F Y (y), to a multivariate distribution that, in this example, gives Pr [X<x,Y<y] , the probability that X and Y are simultaneously below x and y. Such uniform variables correspond to the quantiles of the distributions F X and F Y respectively evaluated at x and y. Thus the dependence measured by copulas is valid for any type of distribution. 5
The likelihood of a variable being below a specific value conditional on another variable being below another particular point can also be calculated by means of copulas. The probability that X is smaller than x conditional on Y being smaller than y can be found by the expression:
[2]
where the notation follows [1] and the symbol "|" stands for "conditional on".
A Copula approach to estimate conditional default

Structural interpretation of probability of default
In this paper, the use of copulas to estimate joint defaults relies on a basic assumption of structural credit risk models (initially proposed by Merton, 1974) according to which an obligor defaults when a latent variable (typically interpreted as the log-return of an obligor's assets) falls below a threshold (the amount needed to pay the outstanding debt). So, if the latent variable is denoted as Y and its cut off value (below which default happens) is y c , the highlighted area in Figure 2 represents the probability of default (PD).
5
For an introduction and more details about copulas, see Nelsen (2006) and Joe (2014) .
[Insert Figure 2 here]
To measure contagion we start with the estimation of the probability that two obligors i and j default at the same time: In credit risk models largely employed by industry nowadays 6 , this likelihood is estimated in line with factor models which assume that the correlation among defaults is driven by the debtors' latent variables (e.g., Bluhm et al., 2010; Crouhy et al., 2014) . These models have the limitations of assuming normally-distributed variables (which in general does not correspond to the reality in financial markets) and using the linear correlation (which is not an adequate measure of dependence when variables diverge from the normalitysee Embrechts et al., 2002) .
Given that the probability of default can be associated to a distribution function (of latent variables), copulas can be used in this context to model the dependence across the latent variables (regardless of their distribution shape) so that the distrib utions F X and F Y in expression [2] result in probabilities of default.
The model
Following structural credit risk models, it can be assumed that the observed PD of a particular financial institution, bank, is the probability that an underlying variable (e.g. its liquid assets) will fall below a specific level (equivalent to the e.g. short-term liabilities). It is not possible to distinguish which proportion of this potential failure is resultant from the default of other financial institutions (i.e. a systemic risk event/systemic shock) and which part is caused by the respective bank's individual characteristics.
To this end we calculate the probability of default of an individual bank at time t conditional on a systemic crisis in the banking system at time t: This can be achieved by estimating the joint probability of default (joint PD) of the bank and the banking system. This joint PD can be estimated via copulas. Based on [2] the probability of an individual bank default at time t (PD bank,t , the probability of its latent variable Y bank,t falling below a threshold y bank,c,t at time t) conditional on a systemic crisis (PD system,t , similarly, the probability of Y system,t < y system,c,t at time t) is given by the copula that links those two variables evaluated at the cut off points Since, for each bank, , the expression above becomes:
. Thus, we can write:
. [3] This means that the probability of default of bank at time t conditional on the failure of the banking system (PD bank|system,t ) will be given by the copula that associates the probability of default of the bank at time t with the probability of a banking system default at time t divided by the banking system's probability of default at time t. This method has the advantage of capturing possible higher impact of the banking system's failure on a bank when their probability of default is higher (e.g. in downturns). Alternatively, lagged data concerning the banking system (PD system,t-1 ) that might trigger the default of other institutions can be used.
According to [3] , if PD bank,t increases and PD system ,t remains constant, PD bank|system,t either increases (likely) or does not change (as the copula C may remain constant due to small increments in PD bank,t ). On the other hand, if PD system,t increases and PD bank,t remains constant, the change in PD bank|system,t calculated in [3] depends on how much C(PD bank,t ,PD system,t ) and
PD system,t change. The same applies to situations where both PD bank,t and PD system,t increase.
It is interesting to note that the copula C refers to the dependence across the latent variables (Y) but data on probability of default (PD) can be used to estimate that copula. Since copulas are invariant under strictly increasing transformations of variables (Embrechts et al., 2002) and PD is a strictly increasing transformation of the latent variables 7 , i.e. PD = F(y), the copula between PDs is identical to the copula between Ys. Thus, to find this copula the observable PD information has to be used. Once the copula that links PDs is identified it can be used to connect the underlying variables. A numerical example (Table 1) elucidates the steps to estimate the bank's probability of default depending on the failure of the banking system. Table 1 (partially) displays some hypothetical values of PDs (in decimal format) for a bank and for the banking system, over a period of T months (naturally, other periods, such as weeks, could be used).
By using [3], we can estimate the conditional PD involving the bank and the banking system for each period. At this point, we will have a bank's probability of default conditional on the systemic event in the banking sector (PD bank|system ) for each month so that we will have a set of T values (since the dataset covers T months)see Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 here]
Hence, in sum, to estimate bank's probability of default conditional on the failure of the banking system we follow a four-step procedure: First, we select candidate copulas to represent the dependence between PD bank and PD system (note that lagged observations of the conditioning banking system can be used). We then use a Maximum Likelihood (ML) method to estimate the best-fit parameter (θ) for each candidate copula (e.g., Joe, 2014) . After that, considering the parameters found in the previous step, we apply a goodness-of-fit test to decide which copula is the best representation of the dependence structure of the observed data (Berg, 2009; Genest et al., 2009 ). Finally, after finding the best-fit copula family (e.g.
Gaussian or Gumbel) and its respective parameter (θ), we use expression [3] to calculate PD bank|system,t for each period t (month t in the example shown in Table 1 ). This will yield a conditional probability of default for each period.
Similar to [3] , the probability of a systemic crisis in the banking system at time t conditional on the default of a particular bank at time t (PD system|bank,t ) is given by:
.
[4]
Data
In this section we explain the sample selection and data collection.
Sample selection and CDS data
We start by selecting the ten 10 We manually check missing accounting values, finding most of them. In some cases, however, we do not find the necessary data, which may b ias our results since balance sheet composition may affect the bank opacity (Flannery et al., 2013) . In a recent paper on bank opaqueness, Mendonça et al. (2013) find that a decrease in bank opaqueness fosters an environment favourable to the development of a sound banking system and the avoidance of financial crises. 11 The year 2004 has to be excluded due to non-availability of the overnight index swap rate. 12 where s is the CDS spread, rf is the risk-free rate, and RR is the recovery rate. The probability of default (PD) of the financial institutions considered is estimated according to the following formula mentioned in Chan-Lau (2013, p. 64): 14 [5]
Note that RR is restricted to RR  -s(1+rf)+1 given that 0 ≤ PD ≤ 1. Empirical papers find historical recovery ratios for financial institutions of usually 40-60% (Acharya et al., 2004; Conrad et al., 2012; Black et al., 2013) . For our baseline regressions we use a recovery rate of 50% (RR=0.5) as Jankowitsch et al. (2014) In line with a current tendency in the financial industry (Brousseau et al., 2012) , the overnight index swap (OIS) rate is used as the risk-free rate. Contrary to London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) swap rates, the traditional benchmark in the past, the credit risk of counterparties in OIS does not affect rates as much and it therefore can be seen as a default-free rate (Hull and White, 2013) . Moreover, recent illicit practices by banks to influence the LIBOR rate have contributed to the adoption of an alternative proxy for the risk-free rate (Hou and Skeie, 2014) .
The CDS premium of the Europe Banks Sector 5 Year CDS Index (EUBANCD) is used as a proxy for the calculations of the probability of a systemic shock in the European banking system. This CDS index represents a price basket of all bank CDS from Europe and has more than 50 constituents. The other variables were the same used in the calculation of the institutions' PDs.
Copula Selection
We consider four candidate copula families to model the connection between the probabilities of default of the financial institutions analysed: Clayton (lower-tail dependence), Gaussian (symmetric association without tail dependence), Gumbel (upper-tail dependence) and Student t (symmetric association with tail dependence). These families cover the main combinations of features (in terms of symmetry and tail dependence) necessary to capture the possible links between the variables studied and are most commonly used copulas in finance 14 For earlier studies on CDSs' imp lied default probability, see e.g. Duffie (1999) as well as Hull and White (2000) . 15 To show that most of our results do not depend on the recovery rate we chose, we provide results for RRs of 0.10, 0.40, 0.60 and 0.90 as a robustness check. (Czado, 2010) . As for goodness-of-fit tests we use the most robust methods according to Berg (2009) and Genest et al. (2009) .
The number of best-fit copulas for each of the aforementioned families regarding the association across each financial institution and the banking system is shown in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 So, as expected, all the institutions considered present tail dependence and 17 of them (those institutions whose dependence with the bank system is characterized by the Gumbel or the Student t copulas) have stronger connection with the system's distress when their probabilities of default are at high levels. Conversely, the other 30 institutions (whose association with the whole system is expressed by the Clayton copula) have stronger association with the bank system when their default probabilities are low.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Bank characteristics and country controls
The second purpose of our study is to identify determinants of contagion among banks in Europe. We investigate the extent to which, ultimately, panel regressions of joint default probabilites could explain why some banks have a higher influence on systemic risk than others. 16 With this objective in mind, we collect a dataset on idiosyncratic bank characteristics as well as information concerning countries' regulatory environments and macroeconomic conditions. The data on bank characteristics are obtained from Thomson Reuters Worldscope.
The full variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 2 . Where available, we fill data gaps manually with data from banks' websites.
[Insert Table 3 here]
To control for the impact of different macroeconomic conditions and regulations among the European Union jurisdictions, we include another three variables. Differences in (capital) regulation are of special interest, because stricter regulations and powerful supervisors could limit systemic risks. The data we use are provided by the World Bank, Eurostat or European Commission databases (Appendix Table 2 provides detailed definitions and data sources). 
Results
In this section, we first present the results for the estimates of banks' systemic risk and then turn to the panel regressions of the dependent systemic risk measure for our sample of 260 bank observations during the period 2005 -2013.
Systemic risk of European banks
To analyse the determinants of contagion among European banks, we first compute the conditional probabilities PD bank|system and PD system|bank for all banks in the sample following expressions [3] and [4], respectively. The results show that, on average, the highest sensitivity of banks to a potential financial crisis (PD bank|system ) is observed in 2006 (see Table 4 ) whilst the highest risk of collapse of the whole bank system as a consequence of the failure of a single institution (PD system|bank ) happens in 2008 (see Table 5 ). These results indicate that the systemic risk has continuously decreased since the GFC but the sensitivity of individual financial institutions to systemic shocks has oscillated since 2009
with an upward trend in the recent years. This means that, although the probability of a generalised financial crisis resulting from the failure of a single bank has reduced, if such crisis occurs the potential impact on each bank will be, on average, higher than it would have been around five years ago.
However, it is interesting to note that, although the two measures, PD bank|system and PD system|bank , present distinct patterns the magnitude of the latter is higher than the magnitude of the former in all years covered in our sample.
[Insert Table 4 here]
[Insert Table 5 here]
Panel regressions of systemic risk
Turning to our main research question, we try to identify the drivers of contagion among our sample of European banks. To this end, we estimate several linear panel regression models using the annual mean conditional probabilities PD bank|system or PD system|bank as the dependent variables as well as nine bank specific and three country/policy specific explanatory variables: Appendix Table 3 . The Hausmann (1978) specification test indicates that the random effects estimator is only consistent for one regression (assumption of RR=50%) in Table 6 , and thus we use the fixed effects estimator model. The rationale behind the fixed effects model is that, unlike the random effects model, variation across banks is assumed to be neither random nor uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included in the model. All estimation results of the linear fixed effects panel regression models, are based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors because unreported results confirm the presence of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross sectional dependence in our regressions. We control for time fixed effects by splitting the sample in a stable (2005) (2006) (2007) and crisis (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) ) period sample. Appendix Table 4 provides correlations of the variables used in the regressions.
The panel regression models in Table 6 indicate that numerous explanatory variables have a significant effect on bank contagion. Most resulting coefficients, however, match closely with our estimated direction of the influence, which is derived from theory and existing empirical literature: To start with NON_PERF -a proxy for a bank's loan portfolio qualityis significant for systemic risk contribution during the tranquil period. Our results indicate that a high share of loan loss provisions to the total book value of loans increases systemic risk contribution during non-crisis times. The systemic risk sensitivity, however, is not affected by loan loss provisions of banks.
A further variable we use is the regulatory measure TIER1-ratio (or Basel core capital ratio), which is the ratio of core equity capital to total risk-weighted assets, measuring the capacity of loss absorption. According to regulators, a high TIER1-ratio would indicate that the bank is in a solid state and more resilient to external shock. In this case, we would expect it to have a negative impact on a bank's systemic sensitivity. Our empirical results confirm this for the systemic risk sensitivity during the crisis period. During the tranquil period, however, the coefficient for TIER1 indicates the contrary: Systemic risk contribution is driven by TIER1.
Equally from a theoretical perspective Perotti et al. (2011) find that banks that are forced to have a higher regulatory coverage ratio, may be incentivised to take even more risk because they do not internalise the negative realisations of tail risk projects.
As a proxy for the banks' liability portfolio and business type, we utilise DEPOSIT, i.e. the ratio of total deposits to total liabilities. Traditional commercial banks with a focus on nonsecuritised savings and loan business usually have high deposit ratios. In particular, banks with high deposit ratios are financed less via securities or by the capital market in general.
Therefore, they are less connected to other banks or other institutional investors. For these reasons, we expect DEPOSIT to have a negative influence on banks' systemic risk. We cannot confirm this but find a positive correlation of systemic risk sensitivity and the deposit ratio during the crisis period. A high LEVERAGEthe ratio of debt to equitymeans that a bank is financed to a large extent by creditors, exposing them to high financial leverage risk that is due to the actions of private depositors in particular. Our results, however, show insignificant coefficients.
Another bank-specific variable we consider is LIQUIDITY (the ratio of cash and tradable securities to total deposits): A large portion of cash and security reserves is probably advantageous at times of negative shocks in the financial system, when interbank markets easily dry out and liquidity becomes scarce (e.g. Brunnermeier, 2009 For each form of systemic risk, we only report two baseline regressions. We estimate further specifications of the panel regressions using different sets of bank-/country-specific variables.
Although we do not tabulate all results from these additional regressions, we comment on them in the following Section 5.3, where we analyse the robustness of our results.
Robustness checks
We perform numerous checks to examine the robustness of our results to alternate model specifications and different data. To show that our results will not change using a different recovery ratio, Appendix Tables 5 and 6 
Conclusion
In this study, we analyse the major drivers of contagion among banks in Europe. In particular, we explain why some banks are expected to contribute more to systemic events and are more likely to be negatively affected by systemic events in the European financial system than others. In our panel regressions, we find empirical evidence supporting existing literature on bank contagion, identifying the asset/liability structure, loan portfolio risk, and a few macroeconomic conditions as drivers of contagion. We also find that simpler approaches in measuring systemic riskas proposed by Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013)would not be suitable because the systemic risk sensitivity and the contribution of a bank to systemic risk are driven by different factors.
Comparably to Acemoglu et al. (2015) our results highlight that the same factors that contribute to resilience under certain conditions (e.g. liquid assets that decrease systemic risk contribution during the crisis) may function as significant sources of systemic risk under others. To point out the major differences between determinants of systemic risk sensitivity and systemic risk contribution, we find that relatively poorly equity equipped banks, mainly engaged in traditional commercial banking, headquartered in highly indebted countries with strong ties to the local private sector have the highest systemic risk sensitivity. We additionally show that systemic risk contribution stems from those well equity equipped banks with risky loan portfolios that have low amounts of available liquid funds, receive state aid and are located in countries with lower government debts.
Regulators have to consider a broad variety of indicators for systemic importance. Banks' size and liquidity as well as sound economic conditions in the country where they are located in exhibit a reducing effect on systemic risk. Although we propose different measures for systemic risk, we empirically confirm the urgency of recent regulatory approaches to identify channels of contagion among banks in Europe by using a broad set of financial indicators (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013). Macroprudential regulation is essential to prevent systemic risk crises in the banking system. Some limitations of our research, however, remain: Firstly, although our suggested copulabased model can be easily applied by practitioners, it is limited to the bivariate case, that is, each financial institution is only evaluated with respect to the whole banking system. Hence, it will be important to extend this analysis to the multivariate case where the connections among several individual institutions are simultaneously modelled. Moreover the use of CDS data excludes a high number of (admittedly "smaller") institutions without publicly listed CDS securities. 17 The second shortfall is that we do not assess the contagious impact of other financial institutions, such as insurers, investment funds and players from the growing shadow banking system. Finally, to confirm our findings in the long run, future research could try to make use of financial and country data over longer periods. 17 The most useful measures of systemic risk may be ones that have yet to be tried because they require proprietary data only regulators can obtain (Bisias et al., 2012) . This table provides hypothetical data concerning the default probability of a bank at time t ( PD bank,t ) and the probability of d istress in the banking system at time t ( PD system,t ).
Month PD bank PD system Conditional PD
In copula notation Using data fro m PD bank and PD system 1 0.02 0.03 C(PD bank,1 , PD system,1 )/ 
Appendix Table 4: Correlation matrix
The table provides the correlations of the variables used in the panel regressions. Variable defin itions and sources are provided in Appendix Table 2 . As in our baseline regressions, PD system|bank and PD system|bank are calculated by assuming recovery rate (RR) equal to 0.50. 
